Collective Authorities Transparency and Decentralized Trust at Scale

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Deep Dependence on Internet Authorities





Time Service

Naming Authority

IP address of dotsecurity.io?



Client

Current time?

•






Certificate Provider



TLS certificate of dotsecurity.io?

New updates?





Authorities Make and Sign Statements





Time Service

Naming Authority












Certificate Provider







New security update **1.0.1.2** available.







Time Service

Naming Authority










Certificate Provider









Client

New security update 1.0.1.2 available.

Software Update Center





Time Service

Naming Authority










Certificate Provider









Client

New security update 1.0.1.2 available.







Time Service

Naming Authority










Certificate Provider







Client

New security update 1.0.1.2 available.







Time Service

Naming Authority











Certificate Provider







Client

New security update 1.0.1.1 available.



Technical Threats

Adobe Revoking Code Signing Certificate Used To Sign Malware

Google takes Symantec to the woodshed for mis-issuing 30,000 HTTPS certs [updated]

Chrome to immediately stop recognizing EV status and gradually nullify all certs.

DAN GOODIN - 3/24/2017, 4:22 PM



Second Dell backdoor root cert found

Blackhats, head straight to the airport lounge.



25 Nov 2015 at 05:00, Darren Pauli

Lenovo PCs ship with man-in-the-middle adware that breaks HTTPS connections [Updated]

Superfish may make it trivial for attackers to spoof any HTTPS website.

DAN GOODIN - 2/19/2015, 5:36 PM



DigiNotar scandal worsens: 500+ rogue certificates issued, five CAs breached

Man hacked random-number generator to rig lotteries, investigators say


New evidence shows lottery machines were rigged to produce predictable jackpot numbers on specific days of the year netting millions in winnings

Trustwave Admits It Issued A Certificate To Allow Company To Run Man-In-The-Middle Attacks

New attacks on Network Time Protocol

AN GOODIN - 10/22/2015, 12:07 AM








"Hey Lavabit, give us your crypto keys. Ah and you can't tell anybody about it."



Lavabit shutdown to avoid being complicit in crimes against customers.

Legal Threats

"Grml, here. To save space they are printed in 4pt font. You're welcome."



VS.



"Hey Apple, create and sign a backdoored iOS."



Public debate this time, but what about the next round?

Legal Threats


"Hahaha. No."



VS.

Fact:

No Individual Entity is Immune to Compromise or Coercion





Legal Self-Defense

The FBI has not been here

[watch very closely for removal of this sign]

A warrant canary



An actual canary

Ulysses Pacts* for Internet authorities?

*Thanks to Cory Doctorow for pointing out to this analogy




Towards Ulysses Pacts for Internet Authorities

"There's a new version of iOS."


("Ulysses")

Clients only accept an update if Apple **and** enough public witnesses signed it off.



Public witnesses ("Ulysses' crew")


Towards Ulysses Pacts for Internet Authorities






Stronger link T = 2 ... 10

Trust splitting has to scale and increase security, diversity, and independence.






Collective authorities T = 100++



Decentralized Witness Cosigning



Signed by authority and at least T witnesses?






Regular Versus Collective Signing

Excerpt of a public petition from 1866

RESIDENCE. NAMES. Susan B. Anthong Bochester - h. 3 Antointe Brown Blackould Ale Jork Newark I. Juny ing stant Somma d. Monge pose 48 Lingston. Brocklyn Hamit & Eaton 6. West. 14 # 1 Fint at : Cathanine & Wilkeron 83 Chinton Place For york Cligabethe B. Tilton 48 Simageton St. Bartet. Mury Frondin Silbert 293 W. 19" St. Min Gork Chang & Elkep May One Good new york. STATINGEN LEON HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Regular signatures


Signatures in superposition






Collective Signing (CoSi)

1. Announcement



Send statement S now or later


3. Challenge



Send challenge $\mathbf{C} = H(V, S)$




2. Commitment



Aggregate commits $V = \sum_{i} (v_i G)$

4. Response



Aggregate responses $\mathbf{r} = \sum_{i} (v_i - Cx_i)$

Collective (Schnorr) signature: (c,r)



CoSi Features






Security

- Strongest-link robustness
- Proactive guarantees
- Discourages misbehavior

Transparency

- Multi-eye-principle sanity checks
- Public logs



Scalability

- Aggregation
- Communication trees
- Sign: O(log n) (8000 nodes, ~2 sec)
- Verify: O(1)



Security / Transparency Levels

Weakest

Level 0

- Traditional authorities
- No witness co-signing
- No public log(s)

Level 1

- Witness co-signing
- Public log(s)
- Check nothing
- Generic
- Easy to upgrade existing authorities


Strongest

Level 2

- Witness co-signing
- Public log(s)
- Check authority statements
 - E.g., reproducible builds for software updates

Level 3


- Witness co-signing BFT consensus
- Public log(s)
- Check consistency of distributed processes
- E.g., blockchain extension in cryptocurrencies





Scalable Strongly Consistent Blockchains

TX-blockchain (co-signed)




Mining cothority = Consensus group



Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness


Rand{Hound, Herd}

- Randomness beacons
- Distributed
- Bias-resistant
- 3rd-party verifiable
- Scalable (1000+ nodes)
- Low latency



Software Update Transparency


Developers



Chainiac

- Software update system
- Decentralized
- Co-signed update timeline
- Efficient source-to-binary verification

Update timeline (co-signed)





Further details

https://github.com/dedis/cothority

Thanks

@Daeinar

